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Abstract
This paper analyzes the sensitivity of Belgian outbound FDI to cor-
porate taxation rates and economic clustering. Our approach involves
detailed balance sheet data of the foreign affiliates as our proxy of
FDI and a measure of regional knowledge spillovers as agglomeration
variable. The results reveal that investments are sensitive to changes
in fiscal policy, with an average tax sensitivity of around -1.5. We also
pick up an effect of agglomeration economies: a regional increase in
the number of own industry firms dampens tax sensitivity.
Keywords: Corporate Tax Competition, Foreign Direct Investment,
Agglomeration Economies
JEL Classification Numbers: F21, H25, H87
1 Introduction and Literature Overview
It cannot be denied that the level of foreign direct investment worldwide has
seen an significant rise over the past decades. Recent World Bank figures
reveal that total net FDI inflow has increased to over 2% of world GDP
∗I thank the Flemish goverment for the funding of this project through the Steunpunt
Fiscaliteit en Begroting. I also thank Joep Konings, Hylke Vandenbussche, Freddy Heylen
and Carine Smolders for their support and comments.
†VIVES Centre for Regional Economic Policy, LICOS Centre for Institutions and
Economic Performance-KU Leuven. E-mail:tim.goesaert@econ.kuleuven.be
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in 2009, compared to roughly 0.6% in 1980. With an increasing body of
evidence pointing to the potential beneficial effect of FDI for the host countries,
regarding e.g. technological innovation, productivity spillovers or employment
growth1, it should not be surprising that a sizeable part in the economic
literature is devoted to explaining the drivers of FDI. The main focus of this
paper lies in assessing the sensitivy of foreign investment to fiscal policy.
Concerning tax sensitivity, most studies built their analysis on the basic
tax competition model from Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986), in which a rise
in the taxation rate leads to a lower after-tax rate of return and a capital
outflow. Recent work also links back to Horstmann and Markusen (1992),
which models the decision process of an expanding multinational. First, it
deals with the decision to invest or to export. Then, having chosen FDI, the
firm needs to decide on the location and the size of the investment. This last
step is based on the classical, Jorgensonian investment model: an optimizing
firm chooses the amount of investment which equals marginal costs of capital
to the marginal benefits. All models seem to predict a negative effect of
taxation2. Empirical evidence can be traced back to the seminal work of
Hartman (1984), which looks at annual FDI inflows into the U.S. using macro
data. The focus in this literature, however, remained largely on U.S. studies,
concerning aggregate flows, signaling both the economic relevance of these
flows and the problem of data availability. An overview of empirical work can
be found in the meta study by de Mooij and Ederveen (2003). The authors
analyze 25 studies on the tax sensitivity of investments and find a median
tax elasticity of investment of -3.3, suggesting the presence of strong tax
competition . However, the authors also point to the often heterogeneous
results in this literature, which is mainly due to the use of different measures
and levels of aggregation.
In this paper we will follow a micro-economic approach within an European
context. Our analysis will be based on individual company accounts from the
Amadeus database, collected by Bureau van Dijck. This database allows us to
link headquarters of Belgian firms with their aﬄiates and to collect balance
sheet information on both. The benefit of using firm level data is that it
allows us to control for firm characteristics, taking into account information on
the headquarter level or sectoral differences. This is often not possible using
more aggregate levels of FDI information. Other studies that use individual
company data are for instance Buettner and Ruf (2007), which looks at the
location decision of affiliates, and Sto¨whase (2002), which looks at the impact
1see e.g., Javorcik, Saggi, and Spatareanu (2004) or Damijan, Knell, Majcen, and Rojec
(2003)
2More information on the role of taxation can be found in Devereux (2007) or also
Gordon and Hines (2002).
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of taxes on the number of affiliates, both for German MNEs. In this paper,
we will follow the approach from Vandenbussche (2005), Desai, Foley, and
Hines (2002) and Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004), in that we define FDI as the
change in tangible fixed assets of the affiliates belonging to a multinational
group. Often, the literature makes a distinction between the location of the
FDI and the amount of FDI invested in that location. We take the location
decision as given and look at the amount invested, treating FDI in this paper
as a continuous investment decision.
Additional to the sensitivity to tax incentives, we explore the role of ag-
glomeration and geograpic economic clustering on the amount of FDI invested.
These agglomeration effects can work through many channels: firms may
benefit from an established infrastructure, better logistics, a high-skilled labor
force, knowledge spillovers, or other positive external economies3. Bobonis
and Shatz (2007) found evidence that economic activity in a region, measured
by the stock of foreign-owned property, plant and equipment, has a positive
impact on the magnitude of inbound U.S. FDI. We will perform a similar
test , using a proxy for intra-industry knowledge spillovers. However, we will
look for an additional effect: the possible offsetting effect of agglomeration
on tax sensitivity, as explored in the New Economic Geography literature. A
higher taxation rate in one region will not always induce relocation, given that
these agglomeration economies can create quasi-rents for firms and assuming
that the productive factors move with their owner (e.g. Baldwin and Forslid,
2002).
In other words, the clustering of economic activity makes the world lumpy.
The presence of agglomeration economies allows concentrated or ’core’ regions
to hold on to mobile factors of production even when their tax rate is set
at a higher level than less advanced nations, also called periphery regions.
By dividing nations or regions into ’core’ or rich nations versus ’periphery’
or poor regions Baldwin and Krugman (2004) point out that differences in
tax rates can be sustainable and even persistent, without generating tax
competition. They show in fact that greater economic integration, related
to intermediate trade costs, may lead to a ’race to the top’ rather than a
’race to the bottom’. The key mechanism is that the ’core’ region creates
an agglomeration rent through the concentration of economic activity with
important linkages in supply chains and strong demand. Agglomeration thus
means that industry is not indifferent to where it locates as it can earn more
in the core than in the periphery. Hence, governments can tax their industry
3These are determined endogenously through the interaction of agglomeration forces
with dispersion forces: when regions get congested, land prices, office prices and wages
tend to rise as well. Furthermore, local competition is intensified, which may trigger firms
to move to less dense regions to avoid competition and enjoy local monopoly power.
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in the core at a higher rate than in the periphery. Of course there are limits
to the tax difference that can be supported in the presence of such external
effects or agglomeration economies. If the agglomeration benefits are entirely
taxed away, dispersion forces may start dominating which may be irreversible.
For a detailed analysis of the mechanisms behind agglomeration forces and
dispersion forces see also Combes, Mayer, and Thisse (2008).
Besides the perceived benefits of attracting inward FDI flows, this line of
research has other important consequenses for policy makers as it delivers
more insights on the magnitude of tax competition. Looking at the current
situation in the European Union, the low taxation rates of the new member
countries have fueled the debate on harmful tax competition. Traditional
theory suggests that with perfect mobility of capital a suboptimal capital tax
rate will emerge, as governments try to attract more capital. This may well
lead to a race to the bottom of taxation rates4. Recently, a more nuanced view
on tax competition has emerged with the introduction of the New Economic
Geograpy models. However, with further economic integration and capital
becoming more mobile, it should be no surprise that tax harmonization has
been getting increased attention in EU debates.
The structure of this paper is as follows: the next section discusses the
data and methodology in further detail. We will present our results in section
3 and discuss additional robustness checks in the 4th section. We conclude
this paper in section 5.
2 Data and Methodology
2.1 Data Sources
Our empirical work is primarily based on the Amadeus database, collected
by Bureau van Dijck. It provides access to balance sheet data and company
accounts of European incorporated firms. While inclusion criteria can differ
4A small but growing literature has started to explore empirically the fiscal interactions
between governments by estimating a tax reaction function over corporate tax rates, using
spatial econometric methods. The difference between these papers lies in the composition
and modeling of the reaction functions. Crabbe´ and Vandenbussche (2008) work within
the enlarged EU and weigh the other countries’ taxes by distance, finding that the further
a country is from a low tax region, the higher the tax premium it can set. Davies and
Voget (2008) operate in a similar setup, but they comprise more countries and use market
potential as a weighing tool. They find that EU members seem to react more to tax
changes of other EU countries, which hints to the possibility of tax competition within the
European Union. Exbrayat (2008) looks at OECD corporate tax rates and finds evidence
of an agglomeration rent in the tax setting behavior of countries.
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between countries due to differences in national accounting legislation, the
database has a good coverage, especially for medium and large scale firms5.
Apart from financial and operational information, the data cover also other
firm characteristics, such as the ownership structure (including details on direct
and indirect shareholders). This allows us to recreate the group structure
of multinational enterprises, connecting headquarters to their affiliates. By
making this link, we thus obtain a dataset of European affiliates linked to
their parent company. We restrict our analysis to multinationals that have
Belgian headquarters (parents), defined as being the global ultimate owner of
their group with a controlling stake of at least 50% in their affiliates. The
distribution of our final sample is depicted in table 1. We obtained 26 EU host
countries in the period 1997-2005 and we identified 972 daughter companies of
Belgian MNE. Roughly 70% of affiliates are located in Belgium’s neighboring
countries. Spain and Italy are also well represented in our sample. Further
summary statistics are shown in table 2. We note that the distribution is
highly skewed and that affiliate companies have on average fewer assets,
sales and employees. About one third of all firms in the sample are in the
manufacturing sector.
2.2 Taxation Rates
We first turn to the measurement of the taxation variable. Various approaches
have been adopted in the literature (see e.g. Devereux, 2007). We start with
the statutory corporate taxation rate (STR). This is easily available and
straightforward to use. It can also act as a signaling device, which facilitates
firms’ investment decisions. There are some downfalls to this measure. By
only focusing on the taxation rate, it ignores the impact of the taxation base
when assessing the taxation burden firms face. It is in fact possible that low
statutory tax rates might be compensated by a broadening of the taxation
base (e.g. Devereux and Griffith, 2003; Crabbe´ and Vandenbussche, 2008),
making the final outcome for firms not that favorable as originally expected.
Another complication can be that, by just using the average or top STR rate,
the progressivity of the tax system (which is applied in a number of countries)
is often ignored. We also consider effective tax rates, which take the tax
base into account. Concerning their computation, both ex post as ex ante
measures are available (Nicode`me, 2001). The former are defined by the ratio
of tax payments and total pre-tax profits of firm. This computation can be
5In recent years many researchers have used this data base for a variety of applications.
See for instance Budd et al. (2005) for an application of international rent sharing in
European Multinational Enterprises or Helpman et al (2003) for the export decision of
firms
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Table 1: Distribution of Affiliates
Country Affiliates Country Affiliates
Austria 5 Lithuania 1
Bulgaria 1 Luxembourg 6
Croatia 4 Norway 8
Czech Republic 28 Poland 37
Denmark 20 Portugal 2
Estonia 2 Romania 14
Finland 10 Russia 2
France 427 Slovakia 6
Germany 14 Spain 78
Greece 9 Sweden 31
Ireland 6 The Netherlands 83
Italy 53 Ukraine 2
Latvia 2 United Kingdom 121
Source: Amadeus and own calculations.
Table 2: Summary Statistics
Variable Affiliates Headquarters
Total assets (x 1,000 euro) 90,103.5 102,234.3
(380,253) (500,368)
Number of employees 150.303 253.979
(239.819) (950.742)
Total sales (x 1,000 euro) 74,004.84 92,123.45
(93,706.22) (313,213.4)
Percentage of firms in manufacturing 30.32% 25.24%
Source: Amadeus and own calculations. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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performed using both macro- and micro-level information, such as national
accounts or income sheet data. By construction, this measure captures the
history of both firm and country tax systems. Ex ante measures, on the
other hand, are calculated for a hypothetical and well defined investment
project, which makes its computation often cumbersome. Moreover, as the
type and financing of the investment are defined very specifically, the measure
can be less appropriate for some of the investments we analyze. However,
the ex ante measures are preferred as they succeed more in capturing the
tax incentives firms face. When comparing this to backward looking tax
indicators, the influence of past history may cause two identical firms to
incur different tax liabilities, making it difficult to evaluate the effect of tax
legislation (Elschner and Vanborren, 2009). Also, the ex ante indicators do
not suffer from endogeneity bias, unlike the ex post measures6. Two types
of ex ante rates exist: the effective average tax rate (EATR) is often used
when looking at discrete location decisions, the effective marginal tax rate
(EMTR) when assessing investments at the margin (Devereux and Griffith,
2003). As we are studying the impact of taxation on existing firms, where the
location decision has already been made, an EMTR is more suited. However,
as studies on tax sensitivity and FDI often use all three tax burden measures,
we will include both measures in the robustness checks.
The effective rates that we will use in this study are calculated in Devereux,
Griffith, and Klemm (2002). They provide EMTRs and EATRs of a number
of European countries, which are updated regularly by the Institute for Fiscal
Studies7. These rates are derived for hypothetical investments in plant and
equipment and industrial buildings, financed by either equity or debt. This
measure will capture the effect of the statutory tax rate, as well as depreciation
allowances and other tax concessions. These rates, however, do not fully
cover our full set of host countries, which implies that we cannot include a
number of, mainly Eastern European, host countries8. An overview of all
available taxation measures is given in figure 1, where we display the average
EMTR, EATR and STR for the period 1995-2005. The effective rates remain
on average below the statutory rate, indicating that tax concessions and
allowances are of a certain importance in assessing the tax burden. However,
the magnitude of the difference between the two rates can differ among
countries. Ireland, which had on average a low statutory tax rate during the
6As periods of high investment can lead to higher allowances, the ex post taxation
measure will give a lower estimate of the tax burden. This will establish the expected sign,
but suffers from reversed causality (Devereux, 2007).
7For more information, see http://www.ifs.org.uk.
8We have no information on Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia and Ukraine
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observation period, has a very similar EMTR. Italy, on the other hand, has a
much larger gap between STR and EMTR.
Figure 1: Average EMTR, EATR and STR (1995-2005)
Finally, it is important to consider some implications of international
taxation. Multinational firms face a problem of double taxation, meaning
that the profits in their affiliates can get taxed twice: once in the home
country of the MNE and once in the country that hosts the affiliate company.
Tax treaties have been set up to resolve this situation, resulting in two main
approaches. In the credit system, used by e.g. US, Ireland, UK or Italy, the
headquarter firm is subject to the host country’s tax regime, but can subtract
these expenses from its tax payments it faces in the home country. In the
exemption system, used by most EU countries, the profits are only taxed in
the home country of the parent firm (de Mooij and Ederveen, 2003). Thus,
the profits of the affiliates are taxed in the host country only. These two
measures might lead to different incentives: a firm located in a country using
the credit system might be less sensitive towards the taxation rate in the host
country as it can benefit from some tax deduction in the home country. By
contrast, firms active in an exemption system can not reclaim their foreign
tax payments and might face a more hostile environment abroad, resulting
in fewer investments. Empirical justification for this theory is still missing.
Since our dataset contains information on Belgian headquarters only and
their affiliates, the exemption system is the relevant one to consider.
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2.3 Agglomeration effects
Whereas the effect of economic clustering is widely studied, the measure itself
can take many forms. Broadly defined, one can think of rich versus poor
regions, based on GDP per capita, or densily versus thinly populated areas,
using population figures. We will construct a more detailed variable, based
on intra-industry knowledge spillovers. This view dates back from Marshall
(1890), who stated that knowledge spillovers originate from interaction between
workers of the same industry. We construct this measure using firm level
data from Amadeus BvD, summing the number of same industry firms at the
2-digit NACE and 3-digit NUTS level9. For sector i, region r and time t, this
becomes:
KSfirt = log [Nirt]
We will include a similar measure of knowledge spillovers in the robustness
section, summing the total number of employees at the 2-digit NACE level for
each region, defined at the 3-digit NUTS level. However, due to incomplete
reporting of employment levels in Amadeus BvD, this measure might suffer
more from measurement error. We subtract own employment from the total
sum to avoid endogeneity issues. In order to calculate the logarithm, we
add 1. Without this, our measure would be zero for industries with only 1
representative. For firm j in sector i and region r at time t, we get:
KSejirt = log
[∑
j∈i∩r
Ejirt − Ejirt + 1
]
Concerning the offsetting effect of economic clustering on tax sensitivity,
one has to bear in mind that the NEG-framework departs from the classical
tax competition models and that it focuses mainly on the location decisions
of profitable firms. Note that we considered our investments to be continuous,
conditional on the location choice, which makes our outcome a priori unclear.
As some changes in the assets we observe might originate from discrete,
profitable projects for which affiliates of a firm are competing, we could still
pick up this effect. Moreover, there have been attempts to model externalities
from clustering in the traditional tax competition literature. Krogstrup (2008)
shows that, when introducing external economies of scale, a race to the top is
possible within a classical model 10.
9We use the date of incorporation, available in Amadeus, to construct this measure
based on startups.
10Introducing increasing marginal productivity of capital, she assumes that the effect of
external economies outweighs the firm level decreasing marginal productivity of capital.
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2.4 Model and Specifications
For our baseline equation we follow Desai, Foley, and Hines (2002) and Desai,
Foley, and Hines (2004). In particular, we want to study the impact of
corporate taxes in the host country on the total amount of tangible fixed
assets invested in the affiliates by a multinational group. An investment
abroad by a MNE is generally considered as a foreign direct investment if that
company owns a minimum stake of 10% in the receiving company (European
Union Direct Investment Yearbook, 1997). However, in order to get a better
identification of Belgian outbound FDI, we will retain the firms which have a
direct or total ownership share equal to or larger than 50,01%. We consider all
three measures of the tax burden, as discussed above: the statutory taxation
rate, the effective average tax rate and the effective marginal tax rate.
In addition, we add a proxy for the geographic clustering of economic acitiv-
ity in each region. First, we will test whether regions with more intra-industry
knowledge spillovers can attract more FDI. Then, we add an interaction term
between our agglomeration and taxation measures. This is to see if we can
pick up an offsetting effect of agglomeration on the tax sensitivity. A positive
sign on the interaction coefficient indicates that the higher the externalities
from economic clustering, the lower the tax sensitivity of outbound invest-
ments in the affiliates. We summarize these effects in estimating the following
equation:
log TAmnjirt = αj + β1TAX
n
t + β2KSirt + β3KSirtTAX
j
t + β4X
mn
jirt + 
mn
jirt
Our dependent variable in this equation is the natural logarithm of tangible
fixed assets of affiliate j in host country n at time t, belonging to multinational
group m. Fixed effects are defined on the firm level, using αj. TAX
n
t is
our taxation measure defined for country n and time t; KS our measure
for economic clustering as defined above. Xmnjirt controls for variables on the
country, regional, group or firm level. As is common to this literature, we
include three powers of GDP of the host country, reflecting the fact that
larger countries are able to attract more capital. Given that the measure for
the tax burden is either a statutory tax rate, or an effective one, calculated
for a hypothetical investment project, we consider it to be unaffected by the
investment decision of individual firms. If large scale firms are indeed capable
to influence local tax policy, their bargaining position is controlled for through
the fixed effects, assuming that this does not change over our observation
period.
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3 Baseline Results
In a first line of regressions, we test whether we find an effect of taxation and
agglomeration on the amount of investments, using the statutory taxation
rate and the industry specific knowledge spillover measure, constructed by
summing the amount of own industry firms.. We define investment as the
change in tangible fixed assets. To correct for the possible correlation of error
terms within a multinational enterprise, we cluster the standard errors on the
MNE group level. All specifications contain firm fixed effects, year dummies
and GDP controls. In addition, we will also control for group dynamics by
including the logarithm of headquarters’ total assets. In doing so, we try to
control for shocks affecting the investment decision at the group level. We
restrict our sample to all non Belgian affiliates in our sample with a minimum
50.01 percent stake of the controlling headquarter. The results are presented
in Table 311.
In the first two columns we only consider the tax variable. We include the
agglomeration variable in columns (3) and (4), then add the interaction term
in columns (5) and (6). The first four columns reveal a negative tax sensitivity
of about -1.5, which is still in line with the semi-elasticity of -3.2, as reported
in the meta-study of de Mooij and Ederveen (2003)12. These results hold after
controlling for group specific shocks. We do not pick up a significant effect
of the intra-industry knowledge spillovers in columns (3) and (4). Turning
to the last two specifciation, we again observe a negative coefficent for the
tax variable. However, in order to asses the full tax sensitivity, one has
to take the interaction term into account. This coefficient is positive and
significant, which could provide evidence of the possible dampening effect of
agglomeration on the tax sensitivity of firms: as the number of own industry
firms grows, they become less sensitive to changes in taxation.
4 Robustness Checks
In this section we will perform some additional robustness checks. Table 4 and
5 consider the alternative measures for our tax burden: the effective average
tax rate and the effective marginal tax rate. We note that these variables
still capture a negative effect of taxation, but their significance drops slightly.
11We performed an additional robustness check, considering only firms under full owner-
ship. This yielded similar results.
12These coefficients have to be interpreted as a semi-tax rate elasticity, meaning that it
measures the percentage change in assets resulting from a percentage point change in the
taxation rate.
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Turning to the spillovers, these measures fail to pick up a dampening effect
on tax sensitivy: the coefficient of the interaction term is not significant in
any of the two tables. A possible explanation for this drop in significance
might be related to the various assumptions used for the construction of a
hypothetical tax burden.
Table 6: STR and FDI, Including Own Industry Employment
Dependent Variable: Log of Tangible Fixed Assets
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tax Burden -1.584 -1.5 -4.362 -4.468
(1.146) (1.243) (3.476) (3.606)
Log Assets HQ 0.0085 0.00743
(0.0214) (0.0211)
Knowledge Spillovers 0.157** 0.133* 0.0406 0.00875
(0.0731) (0.0753) (0.14) (0.146)
Tax Burden x 0.331 0.355
Knowledge Spillovers (0.394) (0.407)
Constant 53.6 -117.5 69.79 -114.1
(1300.3) (1321.6) (1309.1) (1325.5)
Year Effects Y Y Y Y
Firm Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
GDP Controls Y Y Y Y
Observations 4467 4207 4467 4207
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for MNE group clusters in
parentheses. Firm fixed effects and year dummies are included in all regressions.
*, **, *** reports significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level.
Finally, we reconsider the role of agglomeration on FDI in table 6, looking
at statutory rates only. We introduce an alternative proxy for economic
clustering: we reconstruct our knowledge spillovers based on the amount of
own industry employment. The interaction term is included in columns (3)
and (4). We reconfirm the negative coefficient of our taxation variable in all
specifications, but this is only mildly signifciant13. Regarding the spillover
effects in columns (1) and (2), we note a positive and significant effect: an
increase in own sectoral employment is linked to an increase of investments in
the affiliate. In the last two columns we turn to the possible dampening effect
13P-values range between 0.16 and 0.23.
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of agglomeration on tax sensitivity. We do not seem to pick up an effect in
this setup: although all coefficents have the expected signs, they no longer are
significant. However, it could well be that this agglomeration variable, based
on employment figures, might be less accurate due to incomplete reporting in
the Amadeus database.
5 Conclusion
This paper analyzed the impact of corporate taxes on the investment decisions
of multinational firms. To this end, we constructed a panel dataset of
multinational enterprises with headquarters in Belgium and matched them to
their affiliates located in other European countries. We find an investment
elasticity with respect to the statutory tax rate of around -1.5 on average,
which is in line with earlier results in the literature. The elasticity and
significance drops slightly for our effective taxation measures.
Regarding agglomeration economies, we have tested the effect of intra-
industry knowledge spillovers using a detailed industry specific measure at
the 3-digit NUTS level. We find some evidence of a dampening effect of
agglomeration on tax sensitivity: an increase in the number of own industry
firms makes firms less sensitive to changes in the statutory tax rate.
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